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ABSTRACT
Network data needs to be shared for distributed security analysis.  
Anonymization of network data for sharing sets up a fundamental 
tradeoff between privacy protection versus security analysis 
capability. This privacy/analysis tradeoff has been acknowledged 
by many researchers but this is the first paper to provide empirical 
measurements to characterize the privacy/analysis tradeoff for an 
enterprise dataset. Specifically we perform anonymization options 
on single-fields within network packet traces and then make 
measurements using intrusion detection system alarms as a proxy 
for security analysis capability. Our results show: (1) two fields 
have a zero sum tradeoff (more privacy lessens security analysis 
and vice versa) and (2) eight fields have a more complex tradeoff 
(that is not zero sum) in which both privacy and analysis can both 
be simultaneously accomplished.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General –
security and protection; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication 
Networks]: Network Operations – network monitoring; C.2.m 
[Computer-Communication Networks]: Miscellaneous – packet 
trace processing; D.3.4 [Programming Languages]: Processors
– network trace rewriting; K.6.5 [Management of Computing 
and Information Systems]: Security and Protection. 
General Terms
Security, Measurement, Experimentation, Verification
Keywords
network data sharing, security data sharing, trust management, 
privacy protection, anonymization, network data anonymization,
network log anonymization, data obfuscation, network 
monitoring, network intrusion detection, network packet traces, 
network packet trace anonymization, SCRUB-tcpdump, snort
1. INTRODUCTION
Security operations staff use data, such as network packet traces, 
to help defend their own organizational networks. Since attackers 
typically attack across network boundaries and frequently change 
targets to attack within different security domains, effective 
protection requires defenders to look beyond their own 
organizational perimeter toward cooperation and data sharing with 
other organizations in order to defeat attackers.  However, to date 
little or no data sharing has occurred between organizations due to 
practical concerns.  Unfortunately, this is not also true for 
attackers who are quite efficient at sharing vulnerability and 
exploit information amongst themselves.[3]
The practical concerns which have prevented organizations from 
sharing network packet traces include the resources needed to 
prepare data for sharing and a valid fear that private and/or 
sensitive information in shared data may be misused to cause 
harm.[9]  Examples of private/sensitive information in network 
packet traces that we may not want to reveal include personally-
identifiable user information, user activities, system 
configurations, network topologies, network services, 
organizational defenses, and attack impacts – all valuable 
information to attackers.
We can prevent attackers from exploiting private/sensitive data 
within shared data by deleting it but the equally important 
challenge is for shared data to remain useful for collaborative 
security analysis – the reason for data sharing in the first place! 
Such collaborative security analysis may include incident 
detection, trend analysis, attack detection, black listing specific 
attackers and attacker techniques, and distinguishing/modeling 
normal versus suspicious network traffic patterns.
How do we accomplish collaborative security analysis with 
shared data if organizations do not trust each other? Absent an 
established trusted relationship, it is difficult for an organization 
to determine if a sharing party is a legitimate peer organization or
an attacker. If trusted relationships can be built using available 
means then sharing data may not be worrisome.  However, it may 
be the case that a significant number of the organizations seeking 
to share have not previously interacted.  Internet security is very 
dynamic requiring many relationships such that building trusted 
relationships to all relevant organizations in near-real-time may 
not be feasible.  Automation is needed.  
Access control automation to shared data is possible for small 
groups but as the group size grows the feasibility of controlling 
access to shared data using access control mechanisms diminishes.  
All it would take is one organization in a group to have its access 
control credentials compromised or one organization in a group to 
turn traitor and then shared data would be exposed.  
Anonymization is an automated solution that can provide practical 
levels of assurance that shared data cannot be used to cause harm. 
However, the use of anonymization entails tradeoffs that must be 
tailored to the participating organizations and specific situations.  
The fundamental tradeoff in data sharing between organizations 
using anonymization is the risk of valuable network data being 
unknowingly disclosed (privacy protection not stringent enough) 
versus valuable network data being needlessly deleted (security 
analysis maligned with privacy protection too stringent) – we refer 
to this as the privacy/analysis tradeoff. Since different 
organizations have security policies with different privacy 
requirements, multi-level anonymization options for each field 
provides flexibility in selecting anonymization schemes to more 
closely match real sharing environments between parties.  While 
one possible approach is to protect privacy of data from all 
organizations at the highest possible level, the tradeoff between 
privacy protection and security analysis is such that the most 
stringent privacy protection anonymization options may 
significantly degrade (or even eliminate) possible insights from 
desired security analysis.  There is no one-size-fits-all 
anonymization scheme that will work, so it is critical to have 
multi-level anonymization options to enable the tailoring of 
anonymization to different sharing situations.
In this paper we specifically focus on characterizing the 
privacy/analysis tradeoffs of anonymization options on single 
fields within a packet, with each field being independently acted 
upon by an anonymization tool.  Characterizing these 
privacy/analysis tradeoffs is a first step toward facilitating trusted 
sharing of packet traces using anonymization. Future work will 
examine the privacy/analysis tradeoffs of multi-field packet trace 
anonymization – the amount of analysis required for the 
combinatorics of multi-field cases is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  We feel it is prerequisite that the single-field case be 
analyzed and documented first (in this paper) before attempting to 
analyze the more complex multi-field case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a survey of related work. Section 3 presents our 
experimental design including an overview of the experimental 
protocol, packet trace anonymization tool, the source dataset, and 
the security analysis system for generating metrics.  Section 4
reports experimental research results. We conclude with a 
summary, conclusions, and future work in Section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
Trust management, as introduced by Blaze et al. [2] in 1996, is a 
unified approach to specifying/interpreting security policies, 
credentials, and relationships that enable security-critical events.1
Trust management entails collecting information necessary to 
establish a trust relationship, dynamically monitor a trust 
relationship, and modify a trust relationship.[11]  Various models 
for trust establishment have been proposed including: (1) public-
key cryptography[7], (2) the resurrecting duckling model[26], and 
(3) the distributed trust model[1].  Both public-key cryptography 
and the resurrecting duckling model are traditional security 
mechanisms that assume trust can be built via out-of-band 
mechanisms or based on a priori knowledge.[22]  However, these 
traditional security mechanisms fail when out-of-band 
mechanisms and a priori knowledge is not possible. For example, 
there is unlikely to be advanced agreement on a trusted third party 
between organizations in different domains that have never 
interacted before.
The distributed trust model for trust establishment can be further 
subdivided into distinct categories:[11]
1. evidence-based models in which entities establish trust 
relationships based on evidence such as keys 
                                                                
1 Prior to 1996 some security solutions for distributed networked 
applications already had an implicit notion of trust management 
based on PGP or X.509 public key certificates.
2. recommendation-based models in which 
recommendations from intermediaries set up trust 
relationships between strangers 
3. pseudonym-based models in which information 
obfuscated by anonymization set up trust relationships 
between cooperating entities such as entities involved in 
a transaction 
This paper is seeking an automated way to build trust between 
distributed organizations so they can share network data based on 
the distributed trust model, particularly the pseudonym-based 
model.  The Marsh thesis on computational artificial trust was the 
first work to seek solutions for building trust on the Internet 
without out-of-band mechanisms or a priori knowledge.[14] 
Computational artificial trust may instead be built via evidence 
from Internet interactions.   However, it was found that the level 
of computational artificial trust is a tradeoff with other properties, 
most notably privacy.   
In [24] Seigneur and Jensen present trust/privacy tradeoffs similar 
to the problem posed in this paper – the more knowledge of an 
entity, the more accurate the trustworthy assessment versus the 
less privacy for the entity (and vice versa).  They propose the use 
of pseudonyms as a level of indirection which allows the 
formation of trust without exposing real-world identity. A 
protocol is presented for incrementally disclosing evidence linked 
to pseudonyms in an attempt to satisfy anonymity (“nymity”) and 
utility thresholds. In [23] the idea of “trust transfer” is proposed in 
which trust is transferred via recommendations from a 
recommender to the subject with a trust engine developed for an 
anti-spam Email example.
[18] presents web service personalization versus privacy tradeoffs.  
While users desire personalized website services, to accomplish 
personalization invades privacy with user profiles created by 
monitoring, analyzing, and storing user data and activities. The 
authors propose a “mask” pseudonym that protects privacy by 
hiding the identity of individual users by classifying them into 
groups.  
[5] introduces the ACORN distributed multi-agent architecture for 
managing information across networks. Trust in ACORN is built 
by implementing an anonymous service provider to protect 
privacy by disassociating agents and users.[5]  A server 
anonymizes information agents before they are sent to the network 
and re-instantiates them on their return from the network.[6]
Initial attempts at privacy-preserving sharing of network data were 
deletion of private/sensitive data which in many cases also 
needlessly destroyed desired information and/or altered the data 
format of the rest of the log.  Anonymization was identified 
simultaneously by many researchers as a better way to enable 
sharing of obfuscated network data that remains useful from an 
analytical point of view while still guaranteeing that 
private/sensitive information cannot be derived.  For a more 
comprehensive treatment of network data anonymization for 
secure sharing see [25].  [31] presents examples of how 
anonymized network data can both protect privacy and still have 
utility for security analysis.
In the network security realm, different anonymization techniques 
provide different levels of privacy protection relative to the 
organizational security policy in question.   The golden rule is that 
anonymized field values must still be valid field values so 
processing is invariant to anonymization.  Anonymization for 
network data includes the following techniques: [20]
 Filtering – deletion of field values
 Replacement – pseudo-anonymous permutation 
mappings or fully-anonymous substitution mapping of
field values
 Reduction of Accuracy – approximating data values
(examples include truncation or rounding) or mapping 
of field values into groups
 Adding Noise –  adding noise to perturb field values
(examples include time shifting)  
 Aggregation – summarization of field values with 
cumulative statistics
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this section we describe experiment components and the 
protocol of how they are used together for producing results for 
analysis.  The components include a packet trace anonymizer tool, 
a large network traffic dataset, and a standard open-source 
security analysis tool.
3.1 Experiment Protocol
Our intention is to make quantitative measurements across a large 
dataset so general statements can be made about the effects of 
anonymization on privacy/analysis tradeoffs when sharing 
network data.  Table 1 is a list of the packet fields and the 
corresponding 91 experiments we conducted. For each of the 91
experiments, we tested the corresponding anonymization options 
over all 131 files in the dataset. We developed scripts to 
automatically configure and execute the anonymization options 
for each field and then piped the output anonymized packet traces 
to an intrusion detection system (IDS) to observe alarm results. 
Processing on each file is an independent replication – no 
algorithm or parameter linkages exist between each replications.
Since each of the 131 files vary in size, content, and when the 
packet traces were captured, we developed a uniform way to relate 
IDS alarm results from different replications.  We first established 
a benchmark number of IDS alarms for each file given no 
anonymization.  Then for each independent replication we 
measured the deviation from the corresponding file benchmark.   
For each anonymization option tested, we then statistically 
processed IDS alarm results relative to the corresponding file 
benchmark to find the mean, standard deviation, and range.   
General intuition is that anonymization is a zero sum tradeoff 
between privacy and security – the more network data is 
anonymized for privacy-protection, the less value the network 
data may be for security analysis. The metric we use as a proxy for 
security analysis is IDS alarms.  We are aware, however, that IDS 
alarms are not a perfect proxy for security analysis.  While less 
IDS alarms maps to lower levels of security analysis, the 
relationship of more IDS alarms to security analysis is non-linear.  
With more IDS alarms, more security analysis may have taken 
place if (and only if) new information is revealed by the new IDS 
alarms. However, more IDS alarms may also decrease ability to 
perform security analysis if the additional alarms are inaccurate or 
redundant.  Despite this additional complexity, IDS alarms do 
provide a quantitative metric for security analysis and we carefully 
examine details about the nature of IDS alarms in the 
experimental results.  
    Table 1.   Experiments on Single-Fields in Packets Traces
Single-Field   
[layer]
Multi-level Anonymization Option 
Experiments
(1)             
Transport Protocol 
Number        
[network]
12 experiments. Anonymization of (1) all packets; (2) TCP 
only, (3) UDP only.  Multi-level anonymization options: (a) 
black marker; (b) pure randomization, (c) keyed 
randomization, (d) bilateral classification [TCP/UDP/ICMP
well-known protocols / other].  
(2)                     
Total Packet     
Length       
[network & PCAP]
4 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker; (b) pure randomization; (c) keyed randomization; and 
(d) grouping [0-100, 101-2000, 2001-65536].   
 (3)                  
Time-To-Live 
[network]
4 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker; (b) pure randomization; (3) keyed randomization; (4) 
grouping [0, 1-32, 33-64, 65-255].
(4)                  
Type-Of-Service
[network]
4 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker (not fragment/fragment), (b) pure randomization, (c) 
keyed randomization, (d) bilateral classification (0 in bit one 
sets all bits to 0, 1 in bit one sets all bits to 1).  
(5)
Fragmentation 
Flags        
[network]  
4 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker (not fragment/fragment), (b) pure randomization, (c) 
keyed randomization.  
(6)                        
IP Address  
[network]
IP address field is anonymized in selected dataset so no 
anonymization experiments possible.
(7)                            
Ports        
[transport]
30 experiments. Anonymization of (1) both source and 
destination ports, (2) source ports only, (3) destination ports 
only.  Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black marker 
[set to 0]; (b) bilateral [below/above 1024]; (c) pure 
randomization; (d) keyed randomization.
(8)              
Sequence Number 
[transport]
6 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker; (b) pure randomization; (c) keyed randomization; (d) 
grouping [0-1M, 1M-2M, 2M-3M, 3M-max value].  
(9)             
Window Size 
[transport]
6 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker; (b) pure randomization; (c) keyed randomization; (d) 
bilateral classification [below/above 10000]; (e) grouping  [0-
1024, 1025-8192, 8193-16384, 16385-32768, 32769-65535].  
   (10 )                 
TCP Flags 
[transport]
11 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker all flags or black marker each flag individually 
[URG/ACK/PSH/RST/SYN/FIN], (b) grouping by setting 
RST/SYN/FIN flags = 0 or by setting URG/ACK/PSH flags 
= 0, (c) pure randomization, (d) keyed randomization.   
(11)            
Payload   
[transport]
Payload field is deleted in selected dataset so no 
anonymization experiments possible.
(12)                     
Time Stamp 
[PCAP]
10 experiments. Multi-level anonymization options: (a) black 
marker; (b) time unit annihilation (seconds:microseconds); (c) 
truncation; (d) enumeration; (e) random time shift; (f) pure 
randomization; (g) keyed randomization.
3.2 SCRUB-tcpdump Tool [28]
We use the SCRUB-tcpdump network packet trace anonymization 
tool due to its flexibility to anonymize all fields and options that 
provide for different levels of anonymization within each field.  
As its name suggests, SCRUB-tcpdump builds upon the popular 
tcpdump [27] tool for easy data management of packet traces 
while simultaneously protecting private/sensitive data from being 
disclosed through the use of anonymization.   With SCRUB-
tcpdump, a user can anonymize fields considered sensitive to 
multiple desired levels by selecting options that remove all 
information, add noise, or permute the data.  
SCRUB-tcpdump is part of a larger effort to build an integrated 
SCRUB* infrastructure for privacy-protected sharing of network 
data based on consistent multi-level anonymization tools. Other 
multi-level anonymization tools for network data which use the 
same algorithms include CANINE for NetFlows [4,12] and 
SCRUB-PA for Process Accounting [21,13]. For more details 
about the anonymization algorithms see [12,13] Three 
anonymization options are reused multiple times so a general 
description is provided:
Black Marker – replacing every value of the field with a 
predefined constant matching the value type expected in the 
field.  Since all the information in the field is eliminated, this 
method results in 100% information loss. [12,13]
Pure Randomization – The value in the field is mapped to 
any valid permutation. To accomplish this, we make use of 
tables to store mappings between unanonymized and the 
corresponding anonymized values.  Because the creation of 
the table is dependent upon the state of the pseudorandom 
number generator and the packet trace being anonymized 
(specifically field values and the order in which they appear) 
mappings will be different every time this algorithm is 
executed (the same input value will be anonymized to 
different output values). If mappings must be consistent 
between different packet traces that are anonymized we 
recommend the use of keyed randomization. [12,13]
Keyed Randomization – The mapping from unanonymized to 
anonymized data is well-defined by a small key.  Thus 
mappings are consistent between different packet traces with 
this method at different times – as long as the same key is 
used.  The implementation uses keyed hashes (also called 
keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code or HMACs).  The 
result of HMAC implementation is that data is no longer 
permuted.  However, collisions are low and hence it is nearly 
a one-to-one correspondence between unanonymized and 
anonymized values. [12,13]  
3.3 Network Packet Trace Dataset
The packet trace dataset selected for experimentation is from the 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), a research 
institution with a medium-sized enterprise network.[10]  Table 2
shows an overview of dataset characteristics. The data was
collected over three months (from October 2004 through January 
2005) on five separate days.  Each day trace covers a range of ten 
minutes to one hour with 2,000+ hosts monitored.  IP is 
dominant with 96-99% of the packets.  The heavy-weight traffic 
applications are network file systems (NFS and Netware Control 
Protocol) and systems backup (Dantz and Veritas).[16]
There are important caveats with using this dataset. While this is 
the only enterprise traffic trace of its magnitude available for open 
study, it is still only one instance that may or may not generalize 
to other enterprises.  Second, the payload field is deleted and the 
IP address field anonymized so anonymization experiments on 
these two fields are not possible. Third, all the data has not yet 
been released for public study – 11GB of packet header traces in 
131 files has been released as of September 2007. Fourth, traffic 
was captured by tapping links from subnets to main routers so 
only traffic between subnets is captured.[16] Fifth, sequential 
scanning activity (both legitimate vulnerability scans and 
malicious probe scans) create structural relationships that become 
a de-anonymization threat – for this reason scanning activity is 
filtered from each packet trace file and instead stored  in separate 
corresponding scan-only files.[17]  Sixth, in many files we found 
truncated UDP packets with length fields we had to recalculated.
     Table 2. Dataset Characteristics (adapted from [16])
LBNL PACKET 
TRACE DATA
DAY 1 DAY 2 DAY 3 DAY 4 DAY 5
DATE
Oct. 4th
2004
Dec 15th
2004
Dec 16th
2004
Jan 6th
2005
Jan 7th
2005
DURATION 10 min 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour
PER TAP 1 2 1 1 1-2
SUBNETS 22 22 22 18 18
PACKETS (M) 17.8 64.7 28.1 21.6 27.7
SNAPLEN 1500 68 68 1500 1500
BYTES (GB) 13.12 31.88 13.20 8.98 11.75
CONNECTIONS
(M) 0.16 1.17 0.54 0.75 1.15
TRACED
HOSTS
2,531 2,102 2,088 1,561 1,558
LBNL HOSTS 4,767 5,761 5,210 5,234 5,698
OTHER 
HOSTS
4,342 10,478 7,138 16,404 23,267
IP  
(% packets)
99% 97% 96% 98% 96%
!IP 
(% packets)
1% 3% 4% 2% 4%
!IP% - ARP
(% packets)
10% 6% 5% 27% 16%
!IP% - IPX
(% packets)
80% 77% 65% 57% 32%
!IP% - OTHER 
(% packets)
10% 17% 29% 16% 52%
TCP 
(% bytes/
% connections)
66% /
26%
95% /
19%
90% /
23%
77% /
10%
82% /
8%
UDP 
(% bytes/ 
% connections)
34% /
68%
5% /
74%
10% /
70%
23% /
85%
18% /
87%
ICMP 
(% bytes/ 
% connections)
0% /
6%
0% /
6%
0% /
8%
0% /
5%
0% /
5%
3.4 Snort IDS
We selected the Snort IDS [19] for experimentation for two 
reasons: (1) we want a widely-used IDS so our experiments are 
reproducible as well as trusted, and (2) we require the ability to 
examine a standard open-source ruleset in order to understand 
why certain rules fire during experimentation. The ruleset utilized 
is the official “Sourcefire VRT Certified Rules (registered user 
release)” for version 2.24 with every rule turned on.2 This is the 
set of rules developed by the Sourcefire company that is 
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continually kept up-to-date to include alerts for the newest and 
most critical security problems.  This ruleset consists of 435 SVT 
(snort vulnerability team) rules, 98 chain headers, and 16 
configuration files.3
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS –
PRIVACY/ANALYSIS TRADEOFFS FOR 
EACH FIELD
4.1 Transport Protocol Number Field
The network layer Transport Protocol Number Field (8 bits) 
identifies where the network layer passes/receives information 
with the transport layer and is important for security analysis 
because it identifies types of packet flows (connection-oriented 
TCP flows, connectionless UDP flows, ICMP error messages, 
etc).  We report that snort alarms are closely tied to well-known 
transport protocols (TCP/UDP/ICMP) such that when these 
transport protocol numbers are anonymized few alarms trigger 
except for alarms not related to IPv4 network packets.4
Figure 1 shows raw data from the pure randomization 
anonymization option on the Transport Protocol Number Field.  
The x-axis is the percent difference in IDS alarms from each of 
131 anonymized files as compared to benchmarks for each file 
without anonymization.  This data validates that snort has distinct 
TCP and UDP alarms that sum to the total number of IDS alarms. 
When all packets are anonymized, IDS alarms percentage change 
varies from -100% (0 alarms after anonymization) to +5482% 
(25,492 more alarms after anonymization). When only TCP 
packets are anonymized, the percent difference in IDS alarms is 
negative (between -100% and 0) since TCP traffic dominates 
UDP traffic and anonymization of TCP packets leaves less UDP 
packets to trigger alarms. When only UDP packets are 
anonymized, a minority of files with significant UDP flows have 
less IDS alarms.     
This field is key to snort IDS analysis, every rule in the ruleset we 
use contains a signature for this field.  Table 3 shows that pure 
randomization of this field creates many snort IDS alarms while 
removing all information from this field via black marker/keyed 
randomization/bilateral classification options decreases alarms to 
zero in the majority of files.  Thus anonymization of the Transport 
Protocol Number Field resembles a zero-sum tradeoff, the more 
privacy the less security analysis capability and vice versa.
                                                                
3 Snort ruleset breakdown by configuration files: local.rules=0, 
bad-traffic.rules=6, scan.rules=12, finger.rules=13, ftp.rules=78, 
rpc.rules=141, rservices.rules=13, dos.rules=12, ddos.rules=30, 
dns.rules=21, tftp.rules=15, icmp.rules=22, misc.rules=53, 
attack.responses.rules=16, other-ids.rules=3, 
experimental.rules=0. 
4 Examples of data link level alarms that triggered with 
anonymization of well-known transport protocol numbers 
include: Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPOE) and
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) alarms. We also had 
randomization mappings to these transport protocol numbers 
which triggered alarms:  53 (SWIPE – IP with encryption), 55 
(MOBILE – IP mobility), 77 SUN ND protocol, and 103 (PIM 
– Protocol Independent Multicast).
Figure 1. Transport Protocol Number Field Anonymization:
Scatter Plot of Pure Randomization Option
We also foreshadow about multi-field interactions – preliminary 
results show that anonymization of the IP transport protocol 
Number Field has precedence over other packet fields. We find 
that when an input file with the transport protocol number 
anonymized via black marker is input to snort, it takes 
significantly shorter processing time since snort switches 
processing to signatures exclusively designed for the data link and 
network layers so deeper transport layer packet inspection is 
short-circuited.  
Table 3. Effect of Transport Protocol Number Field
Anonymization Options
ANONYMIZATION OPTION ALERTS WITH OPTION
BLACK MARKER (mean) -93.89%  (stdev) 24.04
(range) -100 to 0 
PURE RANDOMIZATION (mean) +549.04%  (stdev) 955.77
(range) -89% to +5482%
KEYED RANDOMIZATION (mean) -93.78%  (stdev) 24.04
(range) -100% to 0%
BILATERAL CLASSIFICATION (mean) -93.89%   (stdev) 24.04
(range) -100% to 0%
4.2 Total Packet Length Field 
The network layer5 Packet Length Field (16 bits) denotes the 
length of the IP datagram including all headers/data. Packet length 
is important for security analysis because some security events 
have uniquely sized packets (Slammer Worm at 404 bytes, Nachi 
Worm at 92 bytes, video slicing applications that create files at 
exact MB sizes).  Packet lengths can also be combined with other 
information to indirectly infer information like the identity of a 
file/server/client; or a protocol event (e.g. HTTP item size). 
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length” fields which we did not use – the “captured packet 
length field” for the selected dataset was recalculated since the 
payload field was deleted. 
We report from 4 experiments over all 131 files that 
anonymization of the Total Length Field has an intermediate
effect on snort IDS alarms. Snort rules check length value validity 
in order to prevent buffer overflow attacks and these alarms may 
be triggered with anonymization options. For instance, total IP 
datagram length cannot be less than the IP header length:
[116:3:1] (snort decoder) WARNING: IP dgm len < IP hdr len!
Table 4 shows that eliminating information from this field via the 
black marker anonymization option greatly increases snort alarms
due to added uncertainty and this decreases security analysis 
capability. The grouping option also adds uncertainty/noise to 
field values which significantly increases snort alarms.  Pure and 
Keyed Randomization options only slightly increase the number 
of snort alarms. Thus, anonymization of the Packet Length Field 
resembles a zero-sum tradeoff, the more privacy the less security 
analysis capability and vice versa.   
Table 4. Effect of Packet Length Field Anonymization Options
ANONYMIZATION OPTION ALERTS WITH OPTION
BLACK MARKER (mean) +32733.23% (stdev) 49102.97
(range) 0  to +286205
PURE RANDOMIZATION (mean)  +20.44%   (stdev) 33.50
(range) 0% to +206%
KEYED RANDOMIZATION (mean) +4.69%   (stdev) 23.43
(range)  0% to +240%
GROUPING (mean) +250.82%  (stdev) 896.92
(range)  0% to +9637%
4.3 Time-To-Live Field 
The network layer Time-To-Live (TTL) Field (8 bits) denotes the 
limited lifetime of a packet in a network.  TTL is important for 
security analysis since: (1) popular operating systems can be 
fingerprinted (identified) from well-known initial TTL values;6 (2) 
path hop lengths can be estimated by subtracting observed TTL 
values from the closest initial TTL value; (3) route changes can be 
detected from TTL changes; (4) TTL can be used as a covert 
channel; and (5) TTL has been proposed for IP traceback.[30]  
We report from 4 experiments over all 131 files that 
anonymization of the TTL Field has no effect on snort IDS 
analysis.  There are no TTL signatures in the snort v.2.24 ruleset, 
however, two rules specific to TTL of DNS packets at the 
application layer (not IPv4 header).  Thus, the TTL Field (as a 
single field) may be anonymized to protect privacy without any 
impact on security analysis using a snort IDS.
4.4 Type-of-Service Field 
The network layer Type-of-Service (TOS) Field (8 bits) is used to 
specify the treatment of an IP datagram during its transmission 
through the Internet. The first 3 bits allow a network administrator 
to assign precedence values from 0 (default) to 7 to classify and 
prioritize types of traffic. Bits 3/4/5 represent requests for low 
delay (D), high throughput (T), high reliability (R) respectively. 
TOS is important for security analysis for the following reasons: 
                                                                
6 Over fifty examples of common initial TTL values: 
<http://members.cox.net/~ndav1/self_published/TTL_values.ht
ml>
(1) it reveals whether an application uses TOS (which is not 
typically implemented), (2) differences in ICMP error messages 
TOS Field may identify/fingerprint types of routers7, and (3) as a 
user-defined field reveals user behavior. Thus, the TOS Field (as a 
single field) may be anonymized to protect privacy without any 
impact on security analysis using a snort IDS.
4.5 Fragmentation Flags Field
The network layer Fragmentation Flags Field (3 bits) is used with 
the Fragmentation Offset Field to provide the ability to transmit 
and reassemble datagram fragments. The “Fragment Flag/Bit”
signals routers not to fragment the current datagram. If this cannot 
be done an error message is returned. The “More Fragments
Flag/Bit” is used to signal whether the datagram being sent is 
actually a fragment of a larger datagram or not fragmented (first 
and only datagram). This field is important for security analysis 
because fragmentation can be utilized to circumvent filtering 
rules.8  
We report from 4 experiments over all 131 files that 
anonymization of the Fragmentation Flag Field has minimal effect 
on snort alarms.  A small number of alarms are triggered by 
fragmented datagrams packets using the UDP (signature for 
filtering circumvention using fragmentation) and  IGMP transport 
protocols (signature for IGMP denial-of-service attack)9, both 
multi-field effects.  Thus, the Fragmentation Flags Field may be 
anonymized to protect privacy with minimal impact on security 
analysis using a snort IDS.
4.6 Ports Field
The transport layer Ports Field (16 bits source/destination) 
identifies a specific process socket where network messages are to 
be forwarded. Ports are important for security analysis because
there is an underlying port number assumption in the ability to 
map port numbers to network services.  Thus packets using 
certain ports are assumed to be running the corresponding service. 
If coordinated between hosts in advance, services can run with 
any port numbers, change dynamically, or be tunneled within 
traffic over unrelated ports. Examples include covert port 
knocking, backdoors installed by attackers on nonstandard ports 
to facilitate return/control, and P2P traffic tunneled within HTTP. 
However, the reality is that most malicious traffic follows the port 
number assumption making port numbers arguably the most 
                                                                
7 <http://seclists.org/nmap-hackers/2000/0332.html>
8 One example is to set the value of the Fragment Offset on a
second packet so low that instead of appending the second packet 
to the first packet, it actually overwrites the data and part of the 
TCP header of the first packet. A packet filter will see that the 
Fragment Offset is greater than zero on the second packet, deduce 
that the second packet is a fragment of another packet, and thus 
not check the second packet against the rule set. Examples of 
other fragmentation attacks can be found in [32].
9 A fragmented IGMP packet may allow the TCP/IP stack to gain 
access to invalid segments of computer memory. 
<http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-
us;238329&sd=tech>
important information used by security analysts.
We report that for our test environment port field anonymization 
has no effect on the number of snort IDS alarms. This is an 
example where port anonymization can protect privacy and yet 
have no effect on IDS security analysis.  Examining the snort 
ruleset we find that the snort signatures which include ports are 
triggered by both port number and payload data.  Since the dataset 
we use has stripped the payload field, there could be no alarm 
matches between port numbers and payload data with or without 
anonymization.  Future experiments are planned with datasets that 
include the payload field.
We also report the effect of Snort preprocessor plug-ins for 
performing behavior analysis on network flows.  In our default 
configuration, the "stream4" preprocessor is loaded. The 
preprocessor configuration allows users to specify ports where 
legitimate servers are operating (e.g., web servers on port 80) in 
which case the preprocessor will switch to identifying suspicious 
flow behavior on these specific ports instead of independently 
processing individual packets. The Snort preprocessor ability may 
be useful with anonymized shared data if the ports field is either 
unanonymized or if server ports are otherwise identifiable. 
4.7 Sequence Number Field 
The transport layer Sequence Number Field (32 bits) is used to 
acknowledge receipt of data which also maintains sequential 
order. Sequence numbers are important for security analysis 
because: (1) the PRNG used to generate sequence numbers cannot 
be easily modified and since different systems have different 
generating functions this provides reliable operating system 
fingerprinting [29], and (2) there are numerous attacks based on 
sequence numbers.10
We report from 6 experiments over all 131 files that 
anonymization of the sequence numbers has no effect on snort 
IDS analysis.  Eight rules in previous snort rulesets used sequence 
numbers in their signatures but none of these rules are contained 
in the v.2.24 snort ruleset.  Thus, the Sequence Number Field (as 
a single field) may be anonymized to protect privacy without any 
impact on security analysis using a snort IDS.
4.8 Window Size Field 
The transport layer Window Size Field (16 bits) provides the 
upper limit of how many bytes a sender can transmit before
receiving an acknowledgment. Window size is important for 
security analysis because different operating systems can be 
fingerprinted due to default and upper limit window size values.11
We report from 6 experiments over all 131 files that
anonymization of the Window Size Field has no effect on snort 
IDS analysis.  One rule in a previous snort ruleset used window 
                                                                
10 For example, the Sequence Number Prediction attack is based 
on the initial sequence numbers (ISN) used by TCP, which
should be random. However, Berkeley Unix starts with an ISN 
of 1 and increments it a fixed number of times per second and 
per connection. It is therefore possible to estimate the next ISN 
that will be used by connecting to the server, recording the ISN 
and then measuring the time to the next connection.
11 Twenty five examples of common window size values: 
<http://www.honeynet.org/papers/finger/traces.txt>
size in its signature but this rule is not contained in the v.2.24
snort ruleset. Thus, the Window Size Field (as a single field) may 
be anonymized to protect privacy without any impact on security 
analysis using a snort IDS.
4.9 TCP Flags Field
The transport layer TCP Flags Field (8 bits) consists of 8 
flag/control bits.  For this paper we consider the six flags (FIN, 
SYN, RST, PSH, ACK, URG) related to TCP connection 
dynamics.  TCP flags are important for security analysis because
they make it possible to identify certain types of denial-of-service 
and session hijack attacks. Due to ambiguities in TCP 
implementations for different operating systems, TCP flags can be 
used to fingerprint different operating systems.12 Probe packets 
with unusual TCP flag combinations have been known to 
circumvent packet filters.[15]
We report from 11 experiments over all 131 files that 
anonymization of the TCP Flags Field had little or no effect on 
snort IDS analysis. There are three types of rules in the v.2.24
snort ruleset which use TCP flags in their signature – alarms for 
(1) DOS BGP spoofed connection reset attempt, (2) miscellaneous 
source ports (20, 53), and (3) scan probes. We found these rules 
did not fire due to random mappings.
4.10 Time Stamp Field
PCAP time stamps packets (seconds:microseconds) as captured 
providing insight into traffic dynamics such as interarrival times, 
unambiguous matching of packets with acknowledgments, and 
detecting packet duplication and reordering.[17]  Time stamps are 
important for security analysis because: (1) they facilitate security 
event correlation, and (2) anomaly-based network IDSs create 
profiles of normal traffic behavior over time and trigger alarms 
when unusual traffic patterns occur.  Time stamps can also be
used to fingerprint computers based on clock drift[8] and to 
indirectly infer information when combined with other data.
We report from 10 experiments over all 131 files that time stamp 
anonymization has no effect on snort IDS analysis.  There are no 
snort v.2.24 rules containing timestamps.  Thus, time stamps (as a 
single field) may be anonymized to protect privacy without any 
impact on security analysis using a snort IDS. Anomaly-based 
IDSs which attempt to correlate events in time to find unusual 
(potentially malicious) activity may have different results.  
5. CONCLUSIONS
Trust management is an active research area.  This work is an 
initial step toward facilitating trusted sharing of network packet 
traces for distributed security analysis based on the use of 
anonymization. While anonymization tradeoffs between privacy 
protection versus security analysis have been speculated upon by 
many researchers, this is the first work to empirically characterize 
these tradeoffs for sharing network data — specifically single-
fields within packet traces.  Future work will study tradeoffs from 
anonymizing multiple-fields within packet traces.
Our results validate intuition that in some cases anonymization 
increases privacy protection at the expense of security analysis 
capability. For instance, protecting privacy with anonymization 
                                                                
12 Four examples of OS fingerprinting using TCP flags: 
<http://www.gray-world.net/papers/ambiguitiesintcpip.txt>
options on the Transport Protocol Number and Packet Length 
Fields come at the expense of security analysis capability. For 
instance, protecting privacy with anonymization options on the 
Transport Protocol Number and Packet Length Fields come at the 
expense of security analysis capability (increased uncertainty 
which significantly increases the number of triggering snort 
alarms).  However, the overall privacy/analysis tradeoff is 
complex and not always a zero sum tradeoff.  We found applying 
anonymization options on eight other single-fields within a packet 
can simultaneously protect privacy and support effective security 
analysis – anonymization on these eight single-fields does not 
affect snort IDS alarms.
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